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IN THE CROSSHAIRS OF CONDEMNATION: A
LOOK AT PRE-CONDEMNATION PLANNING AND
PUBLICITY IN SANTA FE PACIFIC TRUST V.

CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE
Jennifer Kittleson*

INTRODUCTION
Imagine for a moment that you own a valuable piece of commercial
property in a populous downtown city. Within a year of taking ownership, the city’s
mayor publicly announces that the city wants to condemn your property to build a
new public arena. You have a potential lessee in line to rent out a portion of your
property, but the uncertainty of the property’s status causes the potential lessee to
back out. A significant portion of the property remains without tenants for the
duration of the city’s highly-publicized condemnation planning. Finally, after several
years, the city abandons its plan to take the property and the condemnation never
occurs. Valuable rent revenue was lost during this time, but the city will not
reimburse you because it never actually took the property. You bring a lawsuit
claiming inverse condemnation and requesting compensation for the temporary
taking, but the court rejects your claim because this is “just an incident of property
ownership.” You are without rent revenue through no fault of your own, and are
afforded no compensation.
This is what happened to Santa Fe Pacific Trust between 1997 and 2014.1
In 1997, Santa Fe Pacific Trust (“SFPT”) purchased property in downtown
Albuquerque to be used as both commercial rental property and a location for its inhouse data storage business.2 Between 1998 and 1999, however, the City of
Albuquerque (“City”) began discussing a plan to build an arena in the downtown
area.3 The City quickly identified SFPT’s property as the ideal arena location, and
informed SFPT’s owners of its intention to condemn the property.4 Local newspapers
picked up on the story, eventually publishing information about the proposed arena
and its possible location.5 Over the next few years, the City attempted to secure

*
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1. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2014-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 10–11, 335 P.3d 232.
2. Id. ¶ 3.
3. Id. ¶ 4.
4. Id.
5. Jim Ludwick, Chávez Pushes Site For Arena - $1M Would Buy Option to Purchase,
ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Mar. 2, 2006, at C1; Jim Ludwick, City Council To Discuss Arena Land
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funding and obtain requisite city council approval. The City also held several press
conferences to discuss the project and obtain public input.6 Ultimately, however, the
City’s plan to take SFPT’s property never came to fruition.7
SFPT filed suit against the City in 2006, arguing that it suffered damages as
a result of the City’s highly publicized plan to condemn its property.8 The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, and the New Mexico Court of
Appeals affirmed.9 The Court held that SFPT’s inverse condemnation claim failed
under both federal and state law because there was no “concrete government action”
and because the alleged damages were “mere fluctuations in value during the process
of governmental decision-making.”10 Moreover, despite concluding that the City
expressed a concrete intent to condemn SFPT’s property, the Court found that the
City’s actions did not substantially interfere with SFPT’s use and enjoyment of the
property.11
This case demonstrates a tension between the need for public participation
in governmental planning activities and the potential negative impact on property
targeted for condemnation. The outcomes in these situations tend to favor
governmental entities over property owners.12 Notably, courts in New Mexico and
other jurisdictions have held that mere planning that does not deprive the property
owner of all or substantially all viable use cannot constitute a taking within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment takings clause and similar state constitutional
provisions.13 Unfortunately, such strict adherence to traditional takings frameworks
can lead to harsh results for affected property owners. The existing framework should
therefore be changed to ensure that important property rights are not infringed
without just compensation, while at the same time ensuring that governmental
entities are free to plan without unjust liability. By taking a look at the traditional
takings analyses and the policy considerations behind them, this Note suggests slight
Downtown Site to Cost $10M, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Mar. 6, 2006, at B8; Jim Ludwick, Chávez Wants
To Buy, Not Option, Arena Land, ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Mar. 7, 2006, at A1.
6. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 7–8, 10.
7. See id. ¶¶ 1, 9.
8. Id. ¶ 12. SFPT asserted claims for inverse condemnation, deprivation of due process, tortious
interference, and breach of contract. Id. This Note focuses only on SFPT’s claim for inverse
condemnation.
9. Id. ¶ 2.
10. Id. ¶¶ 24, 42 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263, n.9 (1980), rev’d in part by
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005)) (internal punctuation and quotation marks omitted).
11. Id. ¶ 39. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s writ of certiorari on August 29,
2014, Santa Fe Pac. Tr., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2014-NMCERT-008, 334 P.3d 425 (Table) (writ
granted), but subsequently quashed the writ on April 3, 2015, Santa Fe Pac. Tr., Inc. v. City of
Albuquerque, 2015-NMCERT-004, 348 P.3d 695 (Table) (writ quashed).
12. See Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093; City of Colorado Springs v. Andersen Mahon Enters.,
LLP, 260 P.3d 29 (Colo. App. 2010); Agins, 447 U.S. 255, rev’d in part by Lingle, 544 U.S. 528; Joseph
M. Jackovich Revocable Tr. v. State Dep’t. of Transp., 54 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2002); Lipson v. Colo. State
Dep’t of Highways, 588 P.2d 390 (Colo. App. 1978); DUWA, Inc. v. City of Tempe, 52 P.3d 213 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2003). But see G & A Land, LLC v. City of Brighton, 233 P.3d 701 (Colo. App. 2010); Johnson
v. City of Minneapolis, 667 N.W.2d 109 (Minn. 2003); Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345 (Cal.
1972).
13. See, e.g., Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 41; Agins, 447 U.S. at 263 n.9; Joseph M.
Jackovich Revocable Tr., 54 P.3d at 300–01.
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modifications to the New Mexico Court of Appeal’s analyses under both federal and
state law. The ultimate goal is to provide a balanced and flexible approach that can
be applied to a variety of situations common to governmental planning and
condemnation activities.
Part I of this Note will begin with a brief summary the relevant federal and
state takings law, which provides the foundation for the issues litigated in Santa Fe
Pacific Trust. With this basic structure in place, Part II will provide a short overview
of the facts and procedural history of Santa Fe Pacific Trust. Part III will then
examine the New Mexico Court of Appeal’s takings analysis under federal law. This
part will address a perceived deficiency in the Court’s analysis, focusing specifically
on the Court’s decision to bypass the balancing test articulated by the United States
Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.14 Notably,
the Santa Fe Pacific Trust Court concluded that the Penn Central balancing test
could not be applied because there was no “concrete government action or
acquisition of resources” by the City.15 This Note argues that the Court’s conclusion
was in error, as the “character” prong of the Penn Central test is designed to address
the very issue of whether the type of action in question might constitute a taking.
Finally, this part will conclude with a suggested analysis of Santa Fe Pacific Trust
under the Penn Central framework.
Part IV will then examine the Court’s takings analysis under New Mexico
law. This section argues that there is broader protection under the New Mexico
Constitution, as is evident through the “damages provision” of Article II, Section
20.16 This section goes on to argue that “substantial interference” should not require
a near-total loss of the use and enjoyment of the subject property, and that New
Mexico courts should also consider unreasonable delay in cases where property is
targeted for condemnation but never actually taken. Several examples will be
provided to demonstrate how this analysis could be applied. Finally, Part V will
consider the implications of the suggested approach and the important balance that
should be maintained. Namely, governmental entities must be free to adequately plan
for new public projects without fear of automatic liability, but property owners
should not have to bear the burden of these planning activities alone. This part will
conclude by addressing some likely counter-arguments to the suggested analyses.
While the Santa Fe Pacific Trust decision has received modest attention,17
this Note is the first scholarly critique of the case and the implications of the final
decision in New Mexico. Other works have compiled information about similar

14. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
15. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 24.
16. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20 (“Private property shall not be . . . damaged for public use without
just compensation.”).
17. See, e.g., Dan McKay, Property Owner’s Appeal Rejected in Downtown Arena Case,
ALBUQUERQUE JOURNAL, Dec. 1, 2014, https://www.abqjournal.com/503610/appeal-rejected-indowntown-arena-case.html; Gary Gerew, City Wins Case Over Arena Site, ALBUQUERQUE BUSINESS
FIRST, Dec. 1, 2014, http://www.bizjournals.com/albuquerque/blog/morning-edition/2014/12/city-winscase-over-arena-site.html.
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cases18 and have discussed pre-condemnation law generally.19 However, because the
issue in Santa Fe Pacific Trust was the first of its kind before appellate courts in New
Mexico,20 this is the first work to take a look at pre-condemnation planning and
publicity in New Mexico specifically.
It is essential that property owners feel secure in their ownership rights.
Unfortunately the decisions in Santa Fe Pacific Trust and similar cases may cause
property owners to question their ability to effectively use, sell, or lease their
property, which may negatively impact real estate markets and property values.
While governmental entities should certainly be encouraged to gather public input in
planning activities, they must also be aware of how their activities affect property
owners in their jurisdiction. The goal of this Note is to provide a useful framework
that will make it clear when planning activities infringe on individual property rights
and warrant compensation.
BACKGROUND
I.

Overview of Applicable Takings Law

Federal law protects property owners through the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution, 21 which provides that “private property [shall not] be
taken for public use, without just compensation.” 22 Article II, Section 20 of the New
Mexico Constitution affords similar protection, providing that “[p]rivate property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation.” 23 The
general policy is that a few should not have to bear a burden that is meant for the
public as a whole.24
The government or an authorized entity may exercise its takings power by
initiating an eminent domain action pursuant to the applicable statute.25 If, however,
a property owner claims that the government has taken his or her property and must
provide compensation, the affected property owner may bring an action in inverse
condemnation.26 Generally, a valid exercise of police power will not constitute a
compensable taking, such as a regulation that promotes the health, safety, or general
welfare of the community.27 A central question in inverse condemnation actions,

18. Leslie A. Fields & Faegre Baker Daniels, Condemnor Beware: What Activities Can Make You
Liable for Pre-Condemnation Damages, SU027 A.L.I.-CLE 599 (2013).
19. Gideon Kanner, What To Do Until The Bulldozers Come? Precondemnation Planning For
Landowners, SD40 A.L.I.-A.B.A.-CLE 1 (1999).
20. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 30.
21. The Fifth Amendment has been incorporated to apply to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20.
24. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978) (quoting Armstrong
v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
25. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 42A-1-1 to -34 (1981).
26. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 42A-1-29 (1983).
27. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125; Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of
Albuquerque, 1982-NMSC-055, ¶ 10, 646 P.2d 565.
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therefore, is whether the government action or regulation actually constitutes a taking
without just compensation.28
In general, a taking can be physical or regulatory. A physical taking occurs
when there is an actual physical appropriation of private property for public use.29 In
contrast, a regulatory taking occurs when a regulation or government action
substantially interferes with private property.30 That is, there is no physical
appropriation of the private property, but the property owner’s rights are affected as
if there was a physical taking. Because the City did not physically take the property
for which SFPT is seeking damages, the issue in Santa Fe Pacific Trust best falls
under a regulatory takings analysis.
A.

Takings Under Federal Law

A regulatory takings analysis under the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution generally looks to whether a restriction on the use of private
property goes “too far.”31 There exists a small class of regulations that inherently
goes too far, thus constituting a “per se” taking.32 A per se taking occurs when either
a regulation prohibits all economically beneficial or productive use of private
property,33 or when a regulation allows a permanent physical occupation or invasion
on private property by the government or a third party.34 In the latter case, it does not
matter how inconsequential the intrusion.35 In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., for example, a regulation that permitted a third party to permanently
affix cable equipment to private property was enough to constitute a taking.36 Many
times, however, a claim for inverse condemnation does not fit within the traditional
confines of a per se taking as just described. Recognizing the need for an ad hoc
analysis in unique situations, the United States Supreme Court in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City provided a three-factor framework for
analyzing regulatory takings.37 Under what is commonly referred to as the Penn
Central balancing test, the relevant factors in determining whether a taking has
occurred are (1) the extent of economic loss, (2) the frustration with the owner’s
distinct investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the government
action.38 The Penn Central Court focused on these factors as they relate to the
property interest in its entirety, rejecting the argument that a taking can occur in

28. See E.SPIRE Commc’ns, Inc. v. New Mexico Pub. Regulation Comm’n, 392 F.3d 1204, 1210
(10th Cir. 2004).
29. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002).
30. See Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 415 (1922); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 123–24 (1978).
31. Penn. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415.
32. Lucas v. S. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441 (1982).
33. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030.
34. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
35. Id. at 434–35.
36. Id. at 423, 438, 441.
37. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
38. Id.
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relation to a specific portion of the property by itself.39 Although the Court rejected
a takings analysis that focuses on a parcel of property instead of the property as a
whole,40 the Court did recognize the possibility of a partial regulatory taking.41 A
partial regulatory taking may occur when a temporary regulation interferes with a
property owner’s rights, such as a regulation that suspends development.42 In TahoeSierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, for example,
the United States Supreme Court dealt with the question of whether a temporary
moratorium on land development might constitute a taking.43 Like most regulatory
takings, the Court concluded that an alleged partial regulatory taking should be
analyzed under the Penn Central framework44 and is highly dependent on the
specific facts of the case.45 In so holding, the Court expressly rejected a categorical
rule for partial regulatory takings.46
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,47 the United States Supreme Court reviewed a
case with some facts similar to those presented in Santa Fe Pacific Trust. In Agins,
the City of Tiburon initiated eminent domain proceedings to obtain land owned by
the appellants, but subsequently abandoned the proceedings before a physical taking
actually occurred.48 The Court held that the planning activities did not constitute a
taking because the proceedings did not “burden[] the appellants’ enjoyment of their
property as to constitute a taking.”49 Moreover, the Court explained that even if there
was a limited ability to sell or develop the property during the pending condemnation
proceedings, these limitations were lifted once the proceedings ended.50 The Court
39. Id. at 130–31 (“‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and
attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the
character of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the parcel as a whole
. . . .”) (emphasis added). See also City of Coeur d’Alene v. Simpson, 136 P.3d 310, 319 (Idaho 2006)
(“Courts typically reject the so-called ‘conceptual severance’ theory-the notion that whole units of
property may be divided for the purpose of a takings claim.”).
40. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 130–31.
41. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326–27 (2002)
(when considering a partial regulatory taking, however, the Court must still consider the parcel as a
whole).
42. Id. at 306.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 342. In so holding, the Court expressly rejected a formulation of a new categorical rule that
would trigger a “per se” taking in certain situations, such as when a moratorium lasts longer than a year.
The Court was concerned that such strict rules could have a negative impact on necessary planning
processes, and concluded that these situations are best considered under the ad hoc Penn Central factors.
Id. However, in rejecting a per se rule, the Court’s holding did not preclude the possibility that a temporary
land-use restriction could result in a taking. See id. at 337.
45. Id. at 321. See also Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (“[W]e have frequently observed
that whether a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government’s failure to pay for any
losses proximately caused by it depends largely ‘upon the particular circumstances [in that] case.’”
(quoting United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958))).
46. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. 535 U.S. 302, 326.
47. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), rev’d in part by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005).
48. Id. at 257 n.1.
49. Id. at 263 n.9.
50. Id.
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further stated that “[m]ere fluctuations in value during the process of governmental
decisionmaking, absent extraordinary delay, are incidents of ownership. They cannot
be considered a ‘taking’ in the constitutional sense.”51
B.

Takings Under New Mexico Law

Article II, Section 20 of the New Mexico Constitution protects property
owners from the government taking or damaging their private property for a public
purpose without just compensation.52 The Takings Clause of the New Mexico
Constitution has been interpreted to provide similar protection as the Takings Clause
of Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.53 In New Mexico, these
protections have been further codified in NMSA 1978, Section 42A-1-29 (1983),
which provides in relevant part that
[a] person authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain who
has taken or damaged or who may take or damage any property for
public use without making just compensation or without instituting
and prosecuting to final judgment in a court of competent
jurisdiction any proceeding for condemnation is liable to the
condemnee, or any subsequent grantee thereof, for the value
thereof or the damage thereto at the time the property is or was
taken or damaged . . . .
Although the federal Takings Clause and the New Mexico Takings Clause
have been construed to provide similar protections, the structural difference does
warrant slightly different interpretation.54 The New Mexico Supreme Court noted the
difference between the two clauses, and explained that “[f]or inverse condemnation
to be based upon a ‘damage,’ a property owner must suffer some compensable injury
that is not suffered by the public in general.”55 An actual physical taking is not
required.56 Although there is no prior case law concerning pre-condemnation
planning and publicity damages in New Mexico, other takings cases can provide
some useful background that guide this issue. With respect to regulatory takings, the
New Mexico Supreme Court has explained that
a regulation which imposes a reasonable restriction on the use of
private property will not constitute a “taking” of that property if
the regulation is (1) reasonably related to a proper purpose and (2)

51. Id. (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 285 (1939)) (internal citations and
punctuation omitted).
52. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20.
53. Moriarty School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Thunder Mountain Water Co., 2007-NMSC-031, ¶ 8, 161
P.3d 869; New Mexicans for Free Enter. v. City of Santa Fe, 2006-NMCA-007, ¶ 52, 126 P.3d 1149
(stating that “[New Mexico’s] jurisprudence in this area does not materially vary from federal
jurisprudence.”).
54. Compare N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20, with U.S. CONST. amend. V.
55. Estate and Heirs of Sanchez v. Cty. of Bernalillo, 1995-NMSC-058, ¶ 14, 902 P.2d 550.
56. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Harris, 1961-NMSC-165, ¶ 5, 366 P.2d 710.
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does not unreasonably deprive the property owner of all, or
substantially all, of the beneficial use of his [or her] property.57
Estate and Heirs of Sanchez v. County of Bernalillo58 provides a great
illustration of this rule at work. In Sanchez, the plaintiff landowner sought damages
for inverse condemnation when it was denied a special permit to develop a mobile
home park.59 The Court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to damages, as
the regulation affected the public generally60 and did not deprive the owner of all or
substantially all of the beneficial use of the property.61 Presumably, the plaintiff was
not using the property as a mobile home park prior to the permit denial, thus the
denial did not affect the beneficial use of the property.62
New Mexico courts acknowledge that many sources can lead to
compensable damage to property. In City of Santa Fe v. Komis, for example, the New
Mexico Supreme Court recognized that negative public perception can cause
compensable damages when there is a diminution in property value, specifically in
the context of a partial physical taking affecting the untaken adjacent property.63 In
Komis, part of the landowner’s property was taken for the purpose of building a road
for the transport of nuclear waste to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project site.64 The
owner sought damages for the diminution in value to the adjacent, untaken property,
based upon the negative public perception of the government’s intended use of the
taken property.65 The Court held that such damages are compensable,66 reasoning
that “if loss of value can be proven, it should be compensable regardless of its
source.”67
When damages are compensable under Article II, Section 20, the next
question involves the proper measure of damages. Generally, this will include some
“before and after” measurement. In County of Bernalillo v. Morris,68 for example,
the County sought to condemn the landowner’s property, but abandoned the
proceeding before it was finalized.69 In holding that the County was permitted to
abandon its condemnation proceeding, the New Mexico Court of Appeals also held

57. Moongate Water Co., Inc. v. City of Las Cruces, 2013-NMSC-018, ¶ 18, 302 P.3d 405 (quoting
Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 1982-NMSC-055, ¶ 27, 646 P.2d 565).
58. Estate and Heirs of Sanchez, 1995-NMSC-058.
59. Id. ¶ 1.
60. Id. ¶ 16.
61. Id. ¶ 11.
62. See id. ¶ 1.
63. City of Santa Fe v. Komis, 1992-NMSC-051, ¶¶ 7, 11, 845 P.2d 753.
64. Id. ¶ 4.
65. See id. ¶¶ 4–5.
66. Id. ¶ 2.
67. Id. ¶ 11. However, when the exercise of proper police power results in damage to property, there
is generally no compensable taking. See Temple Baptist Church, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 1982NMSC-055, ¶ 27, 646 P.2d 565. Such police powers include “promoting the health, safety, morals or the
general welfare” of a community. Id. ¶ 10. The requisite authority derives from statutory authority granted
by the New Mexico Legislature. Id.
68. County of Bernalillo v. Morris, 1994-NMCA-038, 872 P.2d 371.
69. Id. ¶¶ 2–3.
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that the County must compensate the landowner for the temporary taking.70 Damages
were to be assessed based on what was necessary to return the landowner “to its
position before the condemnation proceeding was commenced against it.”71 In
certain situations, lost profits can be factored into the damages equation. In
Primetime Hospitality, Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, the City’s encroaching waterline
damaged the plaintiff’s property, requiring extra construction costs and delaying the
opening of the plaintiff’s business.72 The New Mexico Supreme Court held that lost
profits directly related to the City’s temporary total taking were recoverable as just
compensation.73 The Court noted that “property” includes several rights, including
the “right to possess, use and dispose of it.”74 The Court reasoned that lost profits,
including those derived from rental value of the property, were an appropriate
measure of damages in that case.75 However, the Court noted that lost profits are not
ordinarily compensable when related to a temporary regulatory taking as opposed to
a temporary total taking.76 In the event of a temporary regulatory taking, “the proper
measure of damages would be based on the property’s fair market value before the
restriction compared to the fair market value with the restriction.”77
II. Santa Fe Pacific Trust Factual Background and Procedural History
In 1997, Santa Fe Pacific Trust (“SFPT”) purchased property in downtown
Albuquerque to be used as both commercial rental property and a location for its inhouse data storage business.78 In 1998, not long after SFPT acquired the property,
Mayor Jim Baca announced his plan to build a public arena in the downtown area.79
Shortly thereafter, a local newspaper published a diagram and photograph of the
potential arena site, which prominently revealed SFPT’s property as the prime arena
location.80 Then in August 1999, SFPT’s property was confirmed as the target
location when Mayor Baca directly informed SFPT’s owners of the City’s intent to
condemn their property.81
The City and the Downtown Action Team then began public discussions
concerning the proposed development, and in 2000 the city council adopted the

70. Id. ¶ 15.
71. Id. ¶ 16.
72. Primetime Hosp., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2009-NMSC-011, ¶ 1, 206 P.3d 112.
73. Id. ¶ 13.
74. Id. ¶ 19 (quoting U.S. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)) (internal quotations
omitted).
75. Id. (“We agree that all of these interests are protected by the just compensation provision of the
New Mexico Constitution, and that rental value is a reasonable—if perhaps necessarily vague—measure
of the value of temporary use and possession denied [to the plaintiff] in this case.”).
76. See id. ¶¶ 16-17 (referring to PDR Dev. Corp. v. City of Santa Fe, 1995-NMCA-074, 900 P.2d
973, which held that lost profits from contingent sales contracts are not the proper measure of damages in
a temporary regulatory taking).
77. PDR Dev. Corp., 1995-NMCA-074, ¶ 11.
78. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 3, 335 P.3d 232, 234.
79. Brief in Chief at 4, Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093 (No. 30,930).
80. Id.
81. Id.
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“2010 Sector Development Plan.”82 The plan clearly identified SFPT’s property as
the location for the new arena, and even labeled the arena as a “Priority I Catalytic
Project.”83 Starting in 2004, the City attempted to secure funding and obtain city
council approval for the project.84 Ultimately, however, the City was unable to get
the requisite funding or city council approval.85 Then on October 4, 2006, many years
after the proposed arena project was announced, SFPT filed suit against the City for
inverse condemnation. SFPT asserted, among other things, that it could not sell or
effectively lease the property as a result of the City’s lengthy project planning and
publicity.86
The district court considered SFPT’s inverse condemnation claim under
both federal and state law,87 and ultimately entered summary judgment in favor of
the City.88 Under federal law, the district court relied on Agins v. City of Tiburon89
and First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,90 which
as the Court of Appeals pointed out, “stand for the unexceptional proposition that
depreciation in value of the condemned property by reason of preliminary activity is
not chargeable to the government.”91 Because of the unique nature of the case, the
district court looked to other jurisdictions to provide guidance in deciding the state
law claim.92 In rejecting SFPT’s state law claim, the district court relied on the
Alaska case of Joseph M. Jackovich Revocable Trust v. State Department of
Transportation,93 which supplied a two-part inquiry for analyzing pre-condemnation
takings claims.94 Under this analysis, a pre-condemnation taking may be found if
“[1] the government . . . publicly announced a present intention to condemn

82. Id.
83. Id. In 2003, during this planning phase, the City and SFPT also entered into an agreement in
which SFPT and the City would eventually exchange small tracts of land and would share in costs of
certain improvements. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 5, 335 P.3d
232. This exchange forms a small part of the issue in Santa Fe Pacific Trust, but it will not be discussed
in this Note. This Note focuses only on the separate land that was not part of the exchange agreement,
which the Court refers to as “the Property” throughout its opinion. See id.
84. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 6–9; Answer Brief of the City of Albuquerque at 7–8,
Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093 (No. 30,930).
85. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 7, 10; Answer Brief of the City of Albuquerque at 8,
Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093 (No. 30,930).
86. Brief in Chief at 1, Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093 (No. 30,930). SFPT also asserted claims
for deprivation of due process, tortious interference with contractual relations, and breach of contract.
Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 12. However, this Note focuses only on the inverse condemnation
claim.
87. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 20.
88. Id. ¶ 14.
89. Agins v. City of Tiburon 447 U.S. 255 (1980), rev’d in part by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
90. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles Cty., Cal., 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
91. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 21 (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church,
482 U.S. 304, 320 (1987)) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted).
92. See id. ¶ 18.
93. Joseph M. Jackovich Revocable Tr. v. State Dep’t of Transp., 54 P.3d 294 (Alaska 2002); Santa
Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 18, 25.
94. Joseph M. Jackovich Revocable Tr., 54 P.3d 294, 300–01.
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specific properties, and [2] it [did] something that substantially interfere[d] with the
landowners’ use and enjoyment of their properties.”95 The district court concluded
that SFPT did not establish either that the City intended to condemn its property or
that the City substantially interfered with the use and enjoyment of its property.96
In reviewing the district court’s holding, the New Mexico Court of Appeals
similarly considered SFPT’s inverse condemnation claim under both federal and
state law.97 The Court ultimately affirmed summary judgment in favor of the City.98
In rejecting SFPT’s takings claim under federal law, the Court agreed with the
district court’s reliance on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Agins v.
City of Tiburon.99 Although Agins was partially overruled by Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A.,100 the Court noted that “the undisturbed portion of Agins is persuasive
authority for the proposition that federal law would not recognize the City’s planning
and publicity in the present case as a taking under the United States Constitution.”101
SFPT, on the other hand, argued that the Court should have applied the balancing
test from Penn Central.102 The Court ultimately declined to apply the Penn Central
balancing test, reasoning that the factors articulated in Penn Central were based on
situations where there was “concrete government action . . . or the acquisition of
resources . . . .”103 Because SFPT did not prove the existence of concrete government
action or acquisition of resources, the Court reasoned that applying the Penn Central
test was problematic and would therefore not support SFPT’s claim.104 Rather, SFPT
had only demonstrated that it suffered fluctuations in value during the City’s
planning process.105 Under Agins, any such value fluctuations are “incidents of
ownership” and are not enough to constitute a taking under federal law.106
The New Mexico Court of Appeals then analyzed SFPT’s state law claim,
paying careful attention to the district court’s reliance on Jackovich.107 The Court
ultimately concluded that the lower court’s reliance on this case was appropriate, as
its reasoning is consistent with both New Mexico law and leading eminent domain
authorities.108 The Court then expressly adopted Jackovich’s two-part inquiry for
pre-condemnation planning and publicity cases109 and applied it to the facts
presented.110 Under this analysis, the Court concluded that SFPT’s state law claim
95. Id.
96. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 18.
97. Id. ¶ 20.
98. Id. ¶¶ 24, 42.
99. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980), rev’d in part by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 23.
100. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545 (2005).
101. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 23.
102. Id. ¶ 22.
103. Id. ¶ 24.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980), rev’d in part by Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
107. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 25.
108. Id. ¶ 37.
109. Id.
110. Id. ¶¶ 39–42.

150

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47; No. 1

failed because SFPT did not establish one part of the two-part test.111 First, and in
contrast with the district court’s holding,112 the Court concluded that SFPT did
establish that the City expressed a present concrete intent to condemn SFPT’s
property.113 However, under the second part of the test, SFPT’s claim was
unsuccessful because it had “failed to establish that the City’s actions substantially
interfered with SFPT’s use and enjoyment of [its] [p]roperty.”114
ARGUMENT
The Court in Santa Fe Pacific Trust considered the question of whether the
City’s pre-condemnation planning constituted a taking under both federal and New
Mexico law.115 This Note takes a critical look at the Court’s analyses under both
systems. First, under the federal law analysis, this Note argues that the Court should
have applied a more thorough analysis using the ad hoc Penn Central balancing test.
Then, under the state law analysis, this Note argues that the Court should have
included unreasonable delay as a relevant factor, and that the court’s interpretation
of “substantial interference” was too narrow.
III. Pre-Condemnation Planning and Publicity Under Federal Law
The alleged taking in Santa Fe Pacific Trust is best classified as a partial
regulatory taking. Like the temporary moratorium in Tahoe-Sierra,116 the alleged
interference in this case was not permanent and was eventually lifted when the City
shifted its focus to a different location.117 The United States Supreme Court expressly
concluded that a per se takings analysis is not appropriate in a partial regulatory
takings case, and instead endorsed the use of the Penn Central factors.118 Courts
applying the Penn Central test consider the following three factors: (1) the economic
impact of the regulation, (2) its interference with reasonable investment-backed
expectations, and (3) the character of the government action.119
In citing the Penn Central factors, the Santa Fe Pacific Trust Court departed
slightly from the traditional analysis, instead identifying the three factors as “(1) the
economic impact of the government regulation on both the claimant and investmentbacked expectations, (2) the character of the government action . . . , and (3)
whether the government action acquires resources to permit or facilitate uniquely
public functions.”120 Specifically, the court combined the first two Penn Central

111. Id. ¶ 39.
112. See id. ¶ 18.
113. Id. ¶ 39.
114. Id.
115. Id. ¶ 20.
116. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002).
117. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 9.
118. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 342.
119. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (quoting the three ad hoc factors from Penn Central Transp. Co., 438
U.S. 104, 124). See also Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538-39 (2005); Kaiser Aetna v.
U.S., 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
120. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 24 (internal citations and marks omitted).

2017

IN THE CROSSHAIRS OF CONDEMNATION

151

factors and then added an extra consideration.121 Despite the minor discrepancy
between the three factors traditionally gleaned from Penn Central, the Court
ultimately declined to apply a thorough Penn Central analysis.122 The Court reasoned
that because the Penn Central test “drew the factors from cases where there was
either a concrete government action . . . or the acquisition of resources,” the
application of the test to SFPT’s facts was problematic.123 The Court concluded that
because “SFPT has not shown the existence of such concrete government action or
acquisition of resources[,] it has shown nothing more than mere fluctuations in value
during the process of governmental decision-making.”124
This Note argues that the Court erred in failing to apply a thorough Penn
Central analysis under federal law. This section will begin by discussing the wellrecognized support for using this test, and will then provide a suggested analysis
under Penn Central. Although the outcome would probably not change under Penn
Central, SFPT should nevertheless have been afforded consideration under this
quintessential ad hoc analysis.
A.

Penn Central is the Appropriate Analysis

The Santa Fe Pacific Trust Court’s refusal to provide a thorough Penn
Central analysis goes against substantial authority that endorses the three-factor test.
First, as articulated in Tahoe-Sierra, temporary regulatory takings are best analyzed
under the Penn Central framework.125 Tahoe-Sierra involved a moratorium on land
development,126 which the United States Supreme Court recognized as a possible
temporary regulatory taking.127 The Court remanded for consideration under the
Penn Central analysis, stating that “the interest in ‘fairness and justice’ will be best
served by relying on the familiar Penn Central approach when deciding cases like
this . . . .”128
Second, the Court’s reliance on Agins does not preclude a Penn Central
analysis. While Agins is somewhat analogous to Santa Fe Pacific Trust, as both dealt
with physical takings that never came to fruition, the majority of the Agins opinion
focused on whether certain municipal zoning ordinances constituted a taking without
just compensation.129 The portion of the Agins opinion that was analogous to Santa
Fe Pacific Trust was not the main issue before the Agins Court, and was consequently
not afforded a thorough analysis.130 It is also important to note that Tahoe-Sierra was
decided more than 20 years after Agins, and it expressly endorsed the use of the Penn
Central test when a temporary regulatory taking is alleged.131 In rejecting a
121. Compare Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 24, with Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617.
122. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 24.
123. Id.
124. Id. (internal quotations and marks omitted).
125. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 342 (2002).
126. Id. at 306.
127. See id. at 321.
128. Id. at 342.
129. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), rev’d in part by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
130. See id. at 263 n.9.
131. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. 302, 342.
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categorical rule132 and instead endorsing the use of the Penn Central factors,133 the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Tahoe-Sierra helps ensure a balance
between a property owner’s rights and reasonable public planning.134 But by relying
on the earlier decision in Agins and dismissing the Penn Central test, the Santa Fe
Pacific Trust Court did not adequately consider the competing interests between
SFPT and the City. The Agins decision certainly contained persuasive authority for
the issue at hand, but it should not have been the only consideration or the final word.
Finally, the way that the Court dismissed the Penn Central test
circumvented the actual purpose of the ad hoc analysis. Penn Central is generally
used when the rigid per se regulatory takings rules do not apply and thus a more factspecific inquiry must be considered.135 However, by rejecting the analysis merely
because the SFPT did not demonstrate “the existence of concrete government action
or the acquisition of resources,” the Court essentially dismissed the test because one
prong of the Penn Central test did not support SFPT’s position. In particular, the
existence (or non-existence) of “concrete government action” should be a relevant
consideration under the “character of government action” prong of the Penn Central
analysis. Because the three-factor test is often described as a “balancing test,”136 each
factor should be considered in conjunction with the other two. Namely, one factor
that goes against the plaintiff’s position may not be dispositive if the other two
factors weigh in favor of the plaintiff. For this reason, the Santa Fe Pacific Trust
Court should have considered the other two factors—the economic impact of the
regulation and its interference with the owner’s investment-backed expectations—in
conjunction with the character of the government action. The dismissal of the Penn
Central test was premature, thus it did not afford SFPT’s takings claim adequate
consideration under federal law.

132. Id. at 339 (“The interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking by regulatory agencies counsels
against adopting a per se rule that would impose such severe costs on their deliberations. Otherwise, the
financial constraints of compensating property owners during a moratorium may force officials to rush
through the planning process or to abandon the practice altogether.”).
133. Id. at 342.
134. See id. (“The interest in ‘fairness and justice’ will be best served by relying on the familiar Penn
Central approach when deciding cases like this, rather than by attempting to craft a new categorical rule.”).
135. See id. at 323–24 (“[W]e do not apply our precedent from the physical takings context to
regulatory takings claims. Land-use regulations are ubiquitous and most of them impact property values
in some tangential way—often in completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings
would transform government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.”).
136. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (2015) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Most takings
cases therefore proceed under the fact-specific balancing test set out in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104[.]”) (emphasis added); Rose Acre Farms, Inc. v. U.S., 559 F.3d 1260, 1282 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (“When balancing the factors adduced through the Penn Central analysis . . . .”) (emphasis
added). But see Jill S. Gelineau, When is a Temporary Taking Not a Temporary Taking? New Cases
Reshape an Old Concept, SU027 ALI-CLE 771 (“Academics mostly treat the test as a balancing test;
however, courts tend to do little balancing.”).
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Applying Penn Central to Santa Fe Pacific Trust

The hallmark of the Penn Central test appears to be a balancing of
competing interests, as analyzed using an ad hoc approach.137 As such, it should not
be constrained by previous applications of the test or other per se rules, so long as
the general purpose of the test is not disturbed. In keeping with the overarching
principle of Penn Central, this Note provides a suggested analysis of Santa Fe
Pacific Trust under Penn Central, which ideally would have been provided by the
Court.
1.

Character of Government Action

The character prong has been long considered one of the more confusing
and troublesome aspects of the Penn Central test.138 Nevertheless, several cases have
helped shape the proper use of this factor. Starting with the source, the Penn Central
Court stated that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than when
interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good.”139 While this suggests that government
action is more likely to be considered a taking when there is physical appropriation,
it does not preclude the possibility that other government action could constitute a
taking. Other cases confirm this notion. For example, a California Court of Appeal
held that a county’s indecisiveness in applying a new development prohibition to the
plaintiff’s project amounted to the type of “character” that weighs in favor of a taking
under Penn Central.140 In that case, the County encouraged the plaintiff to continue
developing his property even in light of the new development regulation, and then
changed its position and announced that the plaintiff’s development could not
continue due to the regulation’s development prohibition.141 It was eventually
determined that the prohibition did not apply to the plaintiff’s property, and thus the
County was responsible for compensating the plaintiff for the temporary regulatory
taking.142 There was no physical appropriation of the property, but the County’s
“about face” in applying the regulation to the plaintiff’s project weighed in favor of
finding that the action was a taking under the character prong of the Penn Central
analysis.143
137. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 559 F.3d at 1282 (“When balancing the factors adduced through the Penn
Central analysis, our objective is to ascertain whether, in light of those factors, it is unfair to force the
property owner to bear the cost of the regulatory action.”).
138. See John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 186
(2005) (“the definition of the term ‘character’ is a veritable mess.”); Mark Fenster, The Stubborn
Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 525, 547–47 (2009) (noting that the Penn
Central Court’s explanation of the character factor “points in two directions at once.”).
139. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
140. Lockaway Storage v. Cty. of Alameda, 156 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607, 626 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 2013).
141. Id. (“The County did not take any action to shut down the [plaintiff’s] project in December 2000
when [the regulation] went into effect. Instead, it encouraged [the plaintiff] to continue its development
efforts for 18 months. Then, in September 2002 the County changed its position and announced that the
project had been doomed since December 2000 because [the plaintiff] had not obtained all permits and
commenced construction before [the regulation’s] effective date.”).
142. Id. at 622, 627.
143. Id. at 625–26.
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Extraordinary delay in commencing an eminent domain action may also be
of the type of character that weighs in favor of a taking under Penn Central.144 In
general, as noted in Agins, some delay that has a negative impact on the property
does not usually constitute a taking.145 However, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals noted that “[t]he general rule that post-announcement delay does not
ordinarily result in a taking, however, is not absolute, and the character of the
government’s delay may give rise to a taking claim under Penn Central.”146 The
Court went on to explain that the existence of extraordinary delay “depends on its
length and the reasons for it.”147 The Court rejected a pure numerical calculation for
determining whether there was an extraordinary delay, and instead emphasized that
such an inquiry must take into account the nature of the planning process, the reasons
for the delay, and “whether the government acted in good faith.”148
In Santa Fe Pacific Trust, the government action in question involved precondemnation activities, such as public meetings, announcements, and negotiations
with SFPT and the City’s funding providers.149 These actions were in furtherance of
a distinct plan to build a public arena, which would be for the benefit of the public.
The Court’s conclusion that such actions were not “concrete” is perplexing, as the
City took substantial steps over several years to obtain the property. Not only did the
City publicly announce the proposed new project and the location,150 but it sought
independent funding, negotiated a proposed purchase agreement, and submitted its
proposals to the city council.151 It is true that these actions were not as significant as
an actual regulation or physical appropriation, but that does not mean that the actions
were any less concrete. Nevertheless, the character prong probably does not weigh
in favor of SFPT’s inverse condemnation claim. While it can be argued that the
government action was clear and concrete, it was still preliminary in nature and was
a necessary element of public planning. Like the Court noted, “[g]overnmental
entities, like the City, must be encouraged to air their planning ideas in public so that
they can be fully vetted, challenged, improved, or rejected.”152 Moreover, although
there is an argument that the character of the City’s actions constituted an
extraordinary delay,153 the City’s actions appeared to be ongoing, consistent, and in
good faith. The City was actively trying to obtain the necessary funding and
approval, and was using appropriate measures in doing so. Unfortunately it was
denied the necessary funding and approval, and thus had to consider new approaches
144. See Potomac Dev. Corp. v. D.C., 28 A.3d 531, 540 (D.C. App. 2011).
145. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 at n.9 (1980), rev’d in part by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
146. Potomac Dev. Corp., 28 A.3d at 540. The Court went on to note that “‘Delay in the regulatory
process cannot give rise to takings liability unless the delay is extraordinary’ and ‘[i]f the delay is
extraordinary, the question of temporary regulatory takings liability is to be determined using the Penn
Central factors.’” Id. (quoting Appolo Fuels, Inc. v. U.S., 381 F.3d 1338, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 540–41.
149. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2014-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 6–8, 10, 335 P.3d 232.
150. Id. ¶ 10.
151. Id. ¶ 6–9. See also Answer Brief of the City of Albuquerque at 7–8, Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014NMCA-093 (No. 30,930).
152. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 42.
153. See infra Section IV.C.3.

2017

IN THE CROSSHAIRS OF CONDEMNATION

155

to the arena project. This understandably takes time. Because the City’s actions were
necessary to its planning and were generally consistent over the years, the character
prong probably weighs in favor of the City.
2.

Economic Impact

The economic impact of the government action is generally the easiest of
the Penn Central factors to apply.154 It is also likely the easiest for the plaintiff to
prove. After all, the plaintiff would not have reason to initiate an inverse
condemnation action if they suffered no economic impact. The relevant inquiry is
the extent of the regulation’s economic impact.155 In general, a very high economic
impact is required for the regulation to be considered a taking.156 In this case, SFPT
claimed that as a result of the decade-long condemnation threat, it was unable to sell,
lease, or operate its property as planned.157 SFPT argued that the impact of the City’s
actions was severe, claiming that its “investment of over $600,000 went for
naught.”158 For SFPT, and probably any similarly situated property owner, the
economic impact of the City’s actions was significant. While the City can probably
argue that this economic impact was not sufficient, as it did not deprive SFPT of all
economic use, it can still be said that SFPT suffered significant economic impact as
a result of the very specific and very public condemnation threat. Thus, the economic
impact prong might weigh in favor of SFPT.
3.

Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations

The final factor considers the relationship between the property and the
owner. Namely, it considers to what extent the regulation interfered with the owner’s
reasonable investment-backed expectations. This factor tends to focus on when and
for what purpose the property was purchased, and also whether the regulation in
question was foreseeable.159 In this case, SFPT purchased the property to use as both
a commercial rental property and a location for its data-storage business. At the time
of the purchase, neither of these expectations was frustrated either through a threat
of condemnation or other regulation. SFPT had no reason to believe that it could not
use the property for its intended purposes at the time it purchased the property, nor
should it expect interference by way of a condemnation threat. As a result of the
City’s subsequent actions, however, SFPT claimed that the planned condemnation
interfered with both its expectations, as it was “not able to sell, lease or operate its
Property for the planned data center.”160 Despite this claim, SFPT conceded that “it
operated at a loss but for the lease to [its subsidiary business].”161 This suggests that
SFPT’s expectation of using the property for its data-storage business was not
154. John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 178
(2005).
155. Id. at 178 (“Generally speaking, the greater the economic impact of a government action the
greater the likelihood of a taking.”).
156. Id. at 178–79.
157. Brief in Chief at 9–10, Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, (No. 30,930).
158. Id. at 9.
159. See Echeverria, supra note 138, at 183–85.
160. Brief in Chief at 9–10, Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, (No. 30,930).
161. Id. at 9.
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significantly affected, but its expectation of renting out the remaining property was
frustrated. Because the Penn Central analysis focuses on the property as a whole and
does not consider severance damages,162 interference with partial investment-backed
expectations may not be enough. Therefore, the final prong probably weighs in favor
of the City, as only a portion of SFPT’s investment-backed expectations were
negatively affected by the City.
Despite the Court’s refusal to apply a thorough Penn Central analysis, such
an analysis probably would not have changed the result under federal law. The
character of the government action was preliminary in nature and public input should
be encouraged. While the economic impact for SFPT was arguably significant, the
City’s interference with its investment-backed expectations was not substantial. Prior
to the City’s announcements, SFPT had already been using the property for its inhouse subsidiary business.163 It does not appear that SFPT intended to use the entire
property for commercial leasing to third parties, so the City’s actions only interfered
with a portion of SFPT’s investment-backed expectations. Penn Central denounced
conceptual severance and emphasized that a takings analysis must consider the
property as a whole.164 The combination of the preliminary nature of the City’s
actions and only a partial interference with SFPT’s investment-backed expectations
would likely support a finding of no taking under federal law. Despite SFPT’s
unlikely success under Penn Central, the Court should nevertheless have applied a
thorough analysis. Penn Central is the quintessential balancing test that is widely
recognized as a proper, ad hoc test in unusual regulatory taking situations.165 The
cursory consideration and ultimate dismissal of the test was in error, as it did not
afford SFPT’s case adequate consideration under federal law. Such an error is not
harmless, as future litigants’ claims may also be easily dismissed under similar
reasoning.
C.

Penn Central Concerns

The Penn Central balancing test has been criticized as vague and
confusing,166 and the character prong of the test has been considered particularly
contentious.167 Despite such criticism, this test is widely recognized as the
appropriate test when an alleged taking does not fit under a physical or categorical
takings analysis.168 In quoting Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, the United States Supreme Court stated that “[o]ur polestar instead remains

162. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130–31 (1978).
163. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 3.
164. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 130–31.
165. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (“Outside these two relatively
narrow categories [of per se takings] . . . , regulatory takings challenges are governed by the standards set
forth in Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104[.]”); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc.
v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 336, 327–28 n.23 (2002).
166. R.S. Radford, Luke A. Wake, Deciphering and Extrapolating: Searching for Sense in Penn
Central, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 731, 735–36 (2011); John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn Central, 23
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 171–72 (2005); Gelineau, supra note 136 (“The legal community also
lacks a general consensus on how the test should be applied.”).
167. Echeverria, supra note 138, at 186 (“the definition of the term ‘character’ is a veritable mess.”).
168. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 336, 327–28 n.23.
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the principles set forth in Penn Central itself and our other cases that govern partial
regulatory takings.”169 Although the test is somewhat ambiguous, some
commentators have argued that the vagueness is appropriate, as the rigid rules in
takings are rarely applicable and an ad hoc approach is better suited for most taking
situations.170 There are compelling reasons to use the Penn Central test when faced
with a distinctive issue such as pre-condemnation planning and publicity in Santa Fe
Pacific Trust. Per se rules or strict criteria for determination in regulatory takings
cases would lead to inequitable results. Often, property owners would be disparately
affected, as strict rules would only apply in narrow situations and would be
inapplicable in unique or unforeseen takings situations. A flexible, ad hoc analysis
provides a bare-bones framework that can be adjusted and applied to these unique
situations. It is designed to take both sides into account, thus it affords the best chance
of a balanced examination.
IV. Pre-Condemnation Planning and Publicity in New Mexico
Because the New Mexico Constitution provides for compensation when
property is “taken or damaged,”171 the New Mexico Takings Provision should
provide broader protection than the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.172 The decision in Santa Fe Pacific Trust, however, does not afford
property owners adequate protection and applies the relevant precedent too narrowly.
This Note argues (1) that the Court should have considered unreasonable delay in its
pre-condemnation takings analysis, and (2) that “substantial interference” should not
require a near-complete loss of beneficial use. This Note then supplies a suggested
analysis for a pre-condemnation planning and publicity cases in New Mexico.
A.

New Mexico Courts Should Consider Unreasonable Delay in PreCondemnation Takings Cases

Prior to Santa Fe Pacific Trust, New Mexico appellate courts never before
considered the issue of whether pre-condemnation planning and publicity can

169. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 336, 327–28 n.23 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633 (2001) (O’Connor J., concurring)); Echeverria, supra note 138, at 173. See also
Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S.Ct. 2419, 2438 (2015) (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (“in the mine run of
cases where governmental action impacts property rights in ways that do not chop through the bundle
entirely, we have declined to apply per se rules and have instead opted for the more nuanced Penn Central
test.”).
170. See generally Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO L.
REV. 93 (2002). See also Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: Exactions and the
Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 609, 615 (arguing that takings formalism does not make
doctrinal and regulatory sense, as supported through an analysis of the rule-like principles supplied in
regulatory exactions cases). Professor Fenster further provides that “[n]o single vision of property and
takings law can suffice to produce sufficiently flexible, contextualized responses to the regulatory needs
and political and social circumstances of land use disputes.” Id. at 653.
171. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 20 (emphasis added).
172. Although courts have interpreted the protections to be similar under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and Article II, Section 20 of the New Mexico Constitution, see cases cited
supra note 53, the underlying case law interpreting these provisions is quite distinct and warrants separate
analyses.
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constitute a taking.173 Understandably, the lower court in Santa Fe Pacific Trust
looked to other jurisdictions for guidance, and the Court of Appeals agreed with the
lower court’s reasoning.174 The Court ultimately adopted the two-part test articulated
in Joseph M. Jackovich Revocable Trust v. State Department of Transportation,175
which considers “(1) whether the government had publicly announced a present
intention to condemn the property in question and (2) whether the government had
done something that substantially interferes with the landowners use and enjoyment
of its property.”176
While intent and substantial interference are important for analyzing precondemnation planning activities in inverse condemnation cases, these should not be
the only considerations. The Court acknowledged that other jurisdictions provide
guidance in this issue,177 but then appeared to simply adopt the Jackovich factors
without consideration of other jurisdictions’ analyses.178 That is, the Court appeared
to be quite deferential to the trial court’s reliance on the two Jackovich factors.
Several other jurisdictions, however, provide a similar analysis but with an additional
factor: unreasonable delay.179 The Supreme Court of California, for example, stated
that “when the condemner acts unreasonably in issuing precondemnation statements,
either by excessively delaying eminent domain action or by other oppressive
conduct, our constitutional concern over property rights requires that the owner be
compensated.”180 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Nevada considered delay an
important consideration in pre-condemnation situations, reasoning that
“[e]xtraordinary delay or oppressive conduct following an announcement of intent
to condemn certain property conceivably reduces the market value of that property—
especially when the government fails to retract its announcement to mitigate its
detrimental effects.”181 The Nevada Court further explained that “[b]y allowing a
cause of action for precondemnation damages, public agencies will be dissuaded
from prematurely announcing their intent to condemn private property.”182 This
173. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 30, 335 P.3d 232.
174. Id. ¶¶ 25, 37.
175. Id. ¶ 37.
176. Id. ¶ 25 (quoting Joseph M. Jackovich Revocable Tr. v. State Dep’t of Transp. 54 P.3d 294, 300–
01 (Alaska 2002) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted)).
177. Id. ¶ 30 (“Courts in other jurisdictions have considered similar situations, and their reasoning is
consistent with the general principles of New Mexico’s law regarding inverse condemnation.”).
178. See id. ¶¶ 31–42. The only other jurisdiction that the Court cites is Alaska.
179. See, e.g., Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas, 181 P.3d 670, 673–74 (Nev. 2008) (permitting
a cause of action for pre-condemnation damages separate from the takings claim when (1) the public
agency expresses an intent to condemn and (2) the public agency acts improperly through unreasonable
delay); Klopping v. City of Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345, 1355 (Cal. 1972) (holding that “a condemnee must
be provided with an opportunity to demonstrate that (1) the public authority acted improperly either by
unreasonably delaying eminent domain action following an announcement of intent to condemn or by
other unreasonable conduct prior to condemnation; and (2) as a result of such action the property in
question suffered a diminution in market value.”); Clay Cty. Realty Co. v. City of Gladstone, 254 S.W.3d
859, 868 (Mo. 2008) (suggesting that “property owners can prevail against condemning authorities for
claims relating to condemnation blight where they provide specific evidence demonstrating aggravated
delay, bad faith, or untoward activity by the condemning authority.”).
180. Klopping, 500 P.2d at 1355.
181. Buzz Stew, 181 P.3d at 673.
182. Id.
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additional consideration exists for good reason. Sometimes pre-condemnation
planning can continue for many years, causing property owners to bear the burden
of possible condemnation for a very long time. The damages incurred may not be
enough to constitute “substantial interference” at any one point, such as when
considered over the course of an individual year. However, when the damages are
considered over many years and aggregated, the interference is much more
substantial. It can be tantamount to “a death by a thousand cuts.” If a property owner
uses the property for a commercial business that operates on tight margins, for
example, these small but incremental damages could be devastating to the business.
By considering undue delay in a pre-condemnation planning case, the court would
provide a more balanced approach that better considers the long-term interests of
property owners.
B.

“Substantial Interference” Should Not Require a Near-Total Loss

This Note argues that the Court in Santa Fe Pacific Trust applied the
damages provision too narrowly. Specifically, the Court acknowledged that Article
II, Section 20 affords compensation when property is damaged but not actually
taken,183 but then denied SFPT’s inverse condemnation claim because its property
was not rendered entirely useless.184 By limiting permissible damages to instances
where the city has deprived the property owner of nearly all beneficial use of the
property, the Court has essentially read out the damages provision of Article II,
Section 20, and instead applies a strict per se takings analysis similar to the
categorical rule under the federal counterpart.185 This does not afford property
owners the protection they deserve under the New Mexico Constitution.
First, in concluding that SFPT’s inverse condemnation claim failed, the
court reasoned that not all consequential damage to property is compensable.186
However, to support its reasoning, the Court relied on cases where the alleged
damages were tangential to the owner’s primary use of the property. For example,
the Court cited Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. Catron,187 which involved
alleged damage to adjacent property following the installation of a high voltage
transmission line.188 The plaintiff argued that the transmission line damaged the
property because it would “destroy the peaceful, unobstructed, rural nature of the
property, will obstruct their panoramic and scenic view, will interfere with television
and radio reception and will emit a loud noise and hum.”189 Although an
understandable inconvenience, it is unlikely that the alleged interference would
significantly affect the property owner’s primary use of the property, whether it be
for a residential or commercial purpose. In Estate and Heirs of Sanchez v. County of

183. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 27 (quoting Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Harris, 1961-NMSC165, ¶ 5, 366 P.2d 710).
184. See id. ¶ 41.
185. See Lucas v. S. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
186. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 28.
187. Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. Catron, 1982-NMSC-050; Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA093, ¶ 28.
188. Catron, 1982-NMSC-050, ¶ 6.
189. Id.
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Bernalillo,190 also cited by the Santa Fe Pacific Trust Court,191 the plaintiff claimed
a taking because it was denied a permit for the development of a mobile home
park.192 However, because the plaintiff was presumably not already using the land as
a mobile home park,193 the permit denial did not affect the current use of the
plaintiff’s property; it only affected the owner’s possible future use. This is similar
to the investment-backed expectations prong of the Penn Central test. In contrast,
SFPT actually used the property as a commercial rental property before the City
began discussing its intent to condemn the property. Arguably, the City’s
condemnation discussions directly affected SFPT’s ability to use the property as it
had previously experienced, thus it directly interfered with a primary use of the
property.194 This scenario is distinguishable from Catron and Sanchez, where the
interference was more remotely related to the plaintiffs’ primary property uses. The
proper focus should be on the property owner’s principal use of the property.
Second, the Court appears to be suggesting that substantial interference
requires a near-total loss of the property’s use and enjoyment.195 As discussed earlier,
the Court in Santa Fe Pacific Trust adopted the two-part Jackovich takings test that
requires (1) intent to condemn and (2) substantial interference. As applied to SFPT,
the Court concluded that there was a concrete present intent to condemn SFPT’s
property, but that the City did not substantially interfere with SFPT’s use and
enjoyment of the property.196 The operative word here is “substantial.” Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “substantial” as “relating to, or involving substance; material” or
“[c]onsiderable in amount or value.”197 A federal case involving a similar takings
situation is also helpful in determining what constitutes “substantial interference.” In
Richmond Elks Hall Association v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency,198 the
plaintiff’s property was targeted as part of a redevelopment plan and was slated for
condemnation.199 The plaintiff used the property as commercial rental property.200
Because the plaintiff reasonably believed that its property would soon be
condemned, it only offered month-to-month leases once the prior leases expired,201
and many of the tenants vacated the property as a result of the redevelopment plan.202
Consequently, the plaintiff’s rental income was reduced to one-third of what it had
experienced prior to commencement of the redevelopment plan and was rendered

190. Estate & Heirs of Sanchez v. Cty. of Bernalillo, 1995-NMSC-058, 902 P.2d 550.
191. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 29.
192. Sanchez, 1995-NMSC-058, ¶ 1.
193. See id. (“Bernalillo County denied the Estate’s application for a special use permit to develop a
mobile home park.” (emphasis added)).
194. However, as will be discussed, this is complicated by the fact that SFPT also used the property
to operate its subsidiary business.
195. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 41.
196. Id. ¶ 39.
197. Substantial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
198. Richmond Elks Hall Ass’n v. Richmond Redevelopment Agency, 561 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1977).
199. Id. at 1329.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.

2017

IN THE CROSSHAIRS OF CONDEMNATION

161

un-saleable.203 The Ninth Circuit held that the interference was substantial, as it
resulted in “a significant reduction in value of the subject property.”204 It appears,
however, that the Santa Fe Pacific Trust Court interpreted “substantial” as
“absolute” rather than “significant.” In supporting its conclusion that the City’s
actions did not substantially interfere with SFPT’s use and enjoyment of its
property,205 the Court first pointed out that SFPT conceded that it was not claiming
that the property was rendered “totally useless.”206 The Court then cited Catron,
which stated that “merely rendering private property less desirable for certain
purposes will not constitute the damage[,] but the property itself must suffer some
diminution in substance, or be rendered intrinsically less valuable, by reason of the
public use.”207 This makes sense, but then to further support its reasoning, the Court
cited Sanchez to explain “that a taking is not unconstitutional unless the
government’s action ‘deprives the [property] owner of all beneficial use of [the
subject] property.’”208 In applying the “substantial interference” prong, the Court
appears to be requiring a “complete interference.” This not only goes against the
Jackovich test, but also against the New Mexico precedent that includes “substantial
deprivation” as a criterion for a compensable regulatory taking.209 By reasoning that
SFPT failed to meet the substantial interference prong because its property was not
rendered totally useless, the Court essentially read out “substantial” and interpreted
this factor as requiring complete interference.
Although it is argued that the Court applied the “substantial interference”
factor too narrowly, the ultimate conclusion was reasonable. The City’s actions
undoubtedly had some impact on SFPT’s ability to rent out some of its rental space,
but SFPT’s in-house business continued to operate within the property without
significant issue.210 Similar to how the federal analysis requires that the court focus
on the property as a whole, here too the court must consider how SFPT used the
entire property. Because a portion of the property remained mostly unaffected, it
cannot be said that SFPT suffered a substantial interference with the use and
enjoyment of its property, even under the more relaxed application suggested in this
Note. It probably can, however, be said that SFPT suffered moderate interference.
This is where unreasonable delay should become relevant, as will be discussed in the
suggested analysis next.

203. Id. at 1329–31.
204. Id. at 1331.
205. Santa Fe Pac. Tr., Inc. v. City of Albuquerque, 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 39, 335 P.3d 232.
206. Id. ¶ 41.
207. Id. (quoting Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. Catron, 1982-NMSC-050, ¶ 7, 646 P.2d 561)
(internal quotations omitted).
208. Id. (quoting Estate and Heirs of Sanchez v. Cty. of Bernalillo, 1995-NMSC-058, ¶ 10, 902 P.2d
550) (emphasis added).
209. See Sanchez, 1995-NMSC-058, ¶ 7 (“To constitute a taking, a regulation must deprive a property
owner of all or substantially all beneficial use of the subject property.”) (emphasis added).
210. See Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 11 (“SFPT would have operated at a loss if not for
leases to related companies, such as [its in-house data storage company].”).
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Suggested Analysis for Pre-Condemnation Planning and Publicity
Under New Mexico Law

By adopting the Jackovich factors, the Santa Fe Pacific Trust Court
recognized that pre-condemnation planning and publicity can give rise to
compensable takings in limited situations. The Court’s adoption of the two Jackovich
factors was a great step to protect property owners from pre-condemnation planning
and publicity damages, but it should go one step further. This Note argues for a slight
variation to the adopted analysis by including a provision for unreasonable delay.
Specifically, an inverse condemnation claim for pre-condemnation planning and
publicity should be analyzed by considering the following: first, whether the
government publicly announced its intention to condemn the targeted property; and
second, whether (a) the government’s planning and publicity substantially interfered
with the property owner’s ability to sell, use, or rent the property as it did before the
condemnation announcement, or (b) the government’s planning and publicity
moderately interfered with the property owner’s ability to sell, use, or rent the
property as it did before the condemnation announcement, and the threat of
condemnation persisted for an unreasonably long period of time.
This suggested analysis includes two factors similar to those adopted by the
Santa Fe Pacific Trust Court, and then provides an alternate consideration of
unreasonable delay. Unreasonable delay would be a consideration in cases where the
property suffered damages over a significant period of time, but where damages do
not rise to the level of “substantial interference” as required by the Jackovich factors
alone. If the delay is considered unreasonable, then that property owner may be
afforded compensation. Of course compensation cannot be awarded to the affected
landowner unless actual damages can be proven and are directly related to the
government’s actions. Therefore, if a taking has occurred under this suggested
analysis, the amount of damages would be dependent on losses incurred during the
government’s planning phase, such as loss of beneficial use or rental income. The
relevant time period would be the time the intended condemnation is publicly
announced through the time when the intended condemnation is publicly
abandoned.211 The following sections provide suggested guidance for each element
of the proposed analysis.
1.

Intent to Condemn

First, the property owner must demonstrate that the government intended to
condemn its property.212 This will generally require that the property owner prove
that the government specifically targeted the property in question rather than
generally target a possible location. For example, when a government entity targets
property somewhere “downtown” or in the “northeast heights,” it will be very
difficult for a single property owner to prove that his or her property was specifically
targeted for condemnation. Ideally, a government entity should seek to target
property broadly until it gets further along in the planning process. The nature of the
211. The actual date of the taking was a point of contention in Santa Fe Pacific Trust. This Note
recognizes that establishing a date of a taking in these pre-condemnation planning cases is an important
consideration, but it is outside the scope of this Note.
212. See Santa Fe Pac. Tr., 2014-NMCA-093, ¶ 33.
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“general target” allows the government entity to publicly discuss its plan and receive
input without specifically harming one piece of property. The generally-targeted area
may see some value fluctuation, but this is more consistent with a broad
condemnation cloud than specific interference. Because the burden is distributed
more broadly, it is less likely that any one property owner will suffer significant
damages, and it is also unlikely that the “intent” element will be established. This is
not to say, however, that a property owner can never prove the government’s specific
intent to condemn his or her property when the government generally targets an area
for condemnation. There may be instances where the government seeks to broadly
describe a general area for condemnation in order to insulate itself from liability
during the pre-condemnation planning phase. If the property owner can demonstrate
that its property was indeed the primary target, then this element might be
established. For example, perhaps the property owner could prove that the
government entity sought funding and obtained construction plans that focused on a
specific plot of property. In that case, the intent to condemn that property owner’s
specific piece of property may still be established even though the government
broadly announced its plans.
If, on the other hand, a government entity explicitly targets an identifiable
piece of property, it is more likely that this intent element is met. This requires not
only that the government identifies the specific piece of property, but also that the
government entity expressed an actual intent to condemn the property. Like in Santa
Fe Pacific Trust, this can be as simple as an explicit project plan and statement to
the media. When property is specifically targeted, the government has approached
the taking in a way that is most detrimental to the property owner. It has singled out
a property owner to bear the burden of the condemnation threat, and it has opened
the door to liability if it either substantially interferes with the property owner’s use
and enjoyment of the property, or takes an unreasonably long time to remove this
burden from the property owner.
2.

Substantial Interference

As described earlier, this Note argues that substantial interference should
not require a near-total loss of use and enjoyment of the property. However, it is
recommended that the interference be measured by the property owner’s use of the
property prior to the condemnation threat. For example, suppose a property owner
was using the property as a retail shop prior to the condemnation announcement.
Following the announcement, the property owner decides that it wants to discontinue
the retail shop and lease the property. Even if the owner can prove that it could not
lease the space due to the condemnation threat, the government’s action would not
constitute substantial interference because it did not interfere with the owner’s
primary use of the property. If, on the other hand, the property was used as rental
property before the condemnation announcement and subsequently suffered a
substantial decline in rental income, then substantial interference might be present.
For further discussion on substantial interference, see supra Section IV.B and infra
Section IV.D.2.
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Unreasonable Delay

Like the other elements, the existence of unreasonable delay is a very factspecific inquiry. Nevertheless, there are some general considerations that could be
useful. First, it is recommended that the government’s progress towards actual
condemnation in combination with the overall length of time be considered. For
example, the more consistent the decision-making process, the less likely the
government’s actions are undue. The more steadily the government is working
toward acquiring the property, the less it is acting improperly because it is working
toward removing the burden that it placed upon the property. Even in light of
consistent planning, however, the overall length of time must also be considered.
Consistent governmental planning that spans a few years can certainly be deemed
reasonable, but even consistent planning spanning twenty years may not.
Next, it is recommended that the unreasonable delay element be considered
when the government entity expresses an actual intent to condemn, but the
interference with the property does not rise to the level of “substantial.” Specifically,
when moderate interference can be shown, then unreasonable delay would allow the
claim to rise the level of a compensable taking. Santa Fe Pacific Trust would best
fall under this suggested application. The City expressed an actual intent to condemn
SFPT’s property, but then SFPT could not prove that the City’s interference was
substantial.213 However, SFPT could argue that the City acted unreasonably by
dragging the plan on even as it incurred significant funding and approval obstacles.214
The first sign that SFPT’s property was subject to condemnation was in 1999 when
Mayor Baca informed SFPT of the proposed project.215 The plan gained some
momentum in 2000,216 but then the more intricate planning did not begin until
2004.217 When City encountered funding and approval issues, it did not abandon its
plan or shift its focus to an alternate location until 2008.218 Thus SFPT was the target
property for almost ten years. Although not substantial, SFPT did experience
moderate interference because it was unable to lease a portion of its property for
several of these years.219 Accordingly, SFPT might be able to prove that it
experienced moderate interference that, when aggregated, was significant, and that
the interference was a result of the City’s unreasonable delay after its condemnation
announcement. However, this factor could easily go the other way. While there were
some disruptions and obstacles during the planning phase, the City’s actions
generally appeared to be ongoing, consistent, and in good faith. The City probably
should not have targeted the property so early on in the planning process, but it did
work toward its ultimate goal of condemning the property and removing this burden
from SFPT. Public projects are not quick endeavors, and the City certainly should
not make rash decisions in obtaining subject property. Consequently, under this
suggested analysis, SFPT would have a better chance of convincing the court that it

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. ¶ 39.
See id. ¶¶ 6–9.
Id. ¶ 4.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id. ¶ 6.
Id. ¶ 9.
Id. ¶ 11.
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was due compensation because of the City’s long planning process, but it would be
a very close call as to whether this delay was actually unreasonable. More facts
would probably be needed to adequately determine whether the City’s actions were
undue, including what the City did between 2000 and 2004.
D.

Applying the Suggested Analysis

This section provides several additional scenarios that seek to demonstrate
how the elements of the suggested analysis work together and might be applied.
Scenario 1.

Intent to condemn, substantial interference with current use

Consider the following variation on the facts of Santa Fe Pacific Trust.
Suppose that the city expresses an actual intent to condemn the plaintiff’s property,
and there is no question that the plaintiff’s property is the target. For the past five
years, the plaintiff has been using its entire property as a commercial rental property.
Following the city’s announcement, two-thirds of the plaintiff’s tenants discontinue
their leases, and that portion of the property remains vacant for two years before the
plaintiff commences its action for inverse condemnation. In this case, there is no
claim that the city has been unreasonably delaying the formal condemnation, but
rather that the city’s actions constitute a substantial interference with the property
owner’s use and enjoyment of its property. While there is no hardline measure of
“substantial interference,” a two-thirds decline in rental income probably meets this
criterion. So long as the property owner can prove that the decline is directly related
to the city’s actions—and that the property owner put forth a good faith effort to
lease the vacant property—the property owner is likely entitled to compensation.
Scenario 2.

Intent to condemn, substantial interference with future plans

Next, consider similar facts as Scenario 1, but with one significant
difference. In this scenario, the property owner has been using the property for its
own in-house business, but plans to move the business elsewhere and begin leasing
out the office space. The city has announced its intent to condemn the property, and
subsequently the property owner moves its business and seeks tenants. The property
owner is only able to lease one-third of the property, and commences an action in
inverse condemnation due to the inability to lease the other two-thirds. In this
situation, although the property owner is suffering the same vacancy as Scenario 1,
the interference here does not affect how the owner was using the property prior to
the condemnation threat. That is, the property owner did not establish that the city
interfered with the owner’s ability to use the property for its in-house business, as it
had been using the property for the past five years. As such, the property owner has
not established substantial interference with the property, and is therefore not entitled
to compensation.
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Intent to condemn, moderate interference, twelve years of
planning

This scenario presents facts similar to those in Santa Fe Pacific Trust but
over a longer period of time. Consider a case where the city announces an intent to
condemn a specific piece of property, and then proceeds over the next twelve years
to plan the project and obtain the requisite funding. The property owner has been
using the property for commercial leasing, and is unable to lease one-third of the
property as a result of the government’s threat of condemnation. The rental decline
is not substantial, but it is certainly significant. Despite continued efforts to lease the
remaining space, the property owner is unable to find suitable tenants. It is now year
twelve and the property owner has operated at a loss due to the inability to fully lease
its property. In this situation, if the damages in the aggregate are significant, then the
twelve-year delay probably warrants compensation. Of course the court should also
take into account the nature of the city’s planning and whether it was consistent and
in good faith. However, even good faith planning can become unreasonable if it
persists for such a long period of time. Excessive delays speak to poor planning and
premature targeting of the subject property. The property owner should not have to
bear this burden alone, and thus should be compensated for the extraordinary delay.
Scenario 4.

Intent to condemn, moderate interference, two years of planning

Finally, consider facts similar to Scenario 3, except that the property owner
seeks compensation just two years following the condemnation announcement. The
city is still working toward its plan to condemn the property, but no formal
condemnation actions have been initiated. The property owner sues in inverse
condemnation, seeking damages for lost rental income of the vacant one-third of the
property. In this case, the city’s planning is still within a reasonable timeframe and
would not warrant compensation in the absence of substantial interference. Because
the interference is moderate and the delay is not yet unreasonable, the property
owner’s inverse condemnation action would likely fail.
Although the above scenarios are on the extreme end of the spectrum, they
seek to provide insight on how the suggested framework might work. When the facts
presented are somewhere in the middle, such as in Santa Fe Pacific Trust, then the
outcome will be less clear and may go either way. This is understandable, as there
are two important competing interests at play. The interests of both sides must be
adequately considered, and the outcome will be highly dependent on the facts of the
case. The final part of this Note will address these competing interests and some
important counter-arguments that should be considered.
V.

Implications and Counter-Arguments

There are two very important interests at odds in these pre-condemnation
planning and publicity cases. The need for public input in planning activities is on
one end, while the security of individual property rights is on the other. Government
entities should not have to worry that every public announcement of possible
condemnation is going to result in liability to every potential condemnee, but at the
same time property owners should not have to suffer significant losses in property
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value or expected revenue because of possible condemnation. While this Note aims
to provide more balanced analyses under federal and state law, there are some
concerns that must be addressed.
This Note has argued that under federal law, the court should have applied
a thorough Penn Central analysis to determine whether the City’s actions rose to the
level of a compensable taking. It is true that Penn Central has been criticized as
ambiguous and confusing,220 but it is nevertheless the “go to” analysis for unique
taking situations. This Note does not suggest that Penn Central should be the only
consideration under federal law. Courts should look elsewhere for guidance in these
unique situations, such as how the Santa Fe Pacific Trust Court looked to Agins v.
City of Tiburon221 for guidance.
Next, this Note has argued that the New Mexico Constitution provides
greater protection to property owners, and thus courts should also consider
unreasonable delay as an additional factor in pre-condemnation takings analyses.
Some may consider this factor to be too favorable to property owners and detrimental
to governmental decision-making. As discussed earlier, however, a long delay is not
dispositive of the issue, as an express intent to condemn and some interference must
also be established to find a taking. The intent to condemn must be specifically tied
to the property in question, and the property owner must have established some
measurable damage related to the threat of condemnation.
Some might also contend that any added protection for property owners will
chill public decision-making, possibly taking decision-making out of the public
realm. However, the suggested analysis attempts to balance the need for public input
by encouraging public entities to discuss their plans broadly at first, and then move
toward more specific targeting as the plans become more defined. Ideally, this would
discourage a public entity from prematurely targeting a specific property before it
can reasonably conclude that the project is feasible.
Introducing unreasonable delay as an element of pre-condemnation
planning and publicity takings may also raise concerns over the statute of limitations.
Particularly, the issue concerns when the statute of limitations would begin to run.222
This is outside the scope of this Note, but because the unreasonable delay factor may
arise after many years of governmental planning, it is recommended that the statute
begin to run at the point that the “taking” occurs as a result of the unreasonable delay.
Determining this date may be problematic, as it is directly tied to the integrity of the
plaintiff’s claim. Nevertheless, it makes more sense to establish the beginning of the
statute of limitations as the date of the alleged taking (i.e., once the delay in planning
became unreasonable) rather than the date that the planning began.223
Finally, it can also be argued that government entities might make rash
decisions in an attempt to shield the entity from undue delay liability. Like previously
mentioned, the suggested analysis still seeks to encourage public input and planning,
220. See supra Section III.C.
221. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), rev’d in part by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
544 U.S. 528 (2005).
222. See Townsend v. State ex rel. State Highway Dep’t, 1994-NMSC-014, ¶¶ 8–9, 871 P.2d 958.
223. See N.M. STAT. ANN., § 42A-1-31(B) (1981) (“No action or proceeding shall be commenced
pursuant to Section 42-1-23 NMSA 1978 against any state agency or political subdivision by any person
unless such action or proceeding is brought within three years from the date of the taking or damaging.”).

168

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47; No. 1

it just attempts to limit specific targeting until the project is more concrete and the
plans are further along in the process. It is understandable that at a certain point,
specific property must be identified, such as when soliciting bids for architectural
designs and construction estimates. Ideally, however, these bids will be necessary
once the public entity is reasonably sure that it can obtain the requisite approval and
funding such that it can begin the more particular aspects of the project planning.
Moreover, the delay must be unreasonable for potential liability to kick in. While
there is no hardline measure of what is unreasonable, it is likely that many years must
pass before unreasonable delay may even be considered.
CONCLUSION
The current state of New Mexico takings jurisprudence is inadequate for
property owners because it does not afford owners the protection they need to feel
secure in their property ownership. This Note aimed to provide suggested analyses
that better balance governmental planning needs and private property rights, as
applied to both federal and state takings claims. First, when presented with an issue
of pre-condemnation planning and publicity argued under the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution, courts should look to the Penn Central factors to
ensure a balanced analysis. As the “go to” approach for unusual regulatory takings
situations, the Penn Central test provides a more complete analysis because it takes
into account the unique facts of the case at hand. Second, when argued under New
Mexico law, this Note suggests a slight modification to the adopted approach by
including a provision for unreasonable delay. This would ideally provide
compensation to property owners who might experience “a death by a thousand
cuts.” Finally, this Note contends that “substantial interference” should not be read
so narrowly so as to only apply to cases where the subject property is rendered
entirely useless. By relaxing the standard, New Mexico courts would give proper
weight to the important damages provision of Article II, Section 20 of the New
Mexico Constitution.
When property is targeted for condemnation, some economic losses may be
expected. But when these losses are substantial or persist for an unreasonably long
period of time, property owners should not be forced to bear the burden alone.
Regulatory takings remain a very ambiguous area of takings law, and much is yet to
be clarified. Nevertheless, this Note advocates that certain safeguards can and should
be adopted to ensure that property owners remain secure in their property ownership,
especially when they find themselves in the crosshairs of condemnation.

